Workplaces in the Primary Economy and Wage Pressure in the Secondary Labor Market*

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Abstract
Two trends have marked the politico-economic discussion in many industrialized countries in recent years. On the one hand, international production, workplace decentralization, shareholder orientation and generous manager remuneration have changed the face of firms in the primary economy. On the other hand, there is increased pressure on the secondary labor market revealed by unemployment or declining wages of low-skilled workers. This paper establishes a causal relationship between these two trends by developing a model in which labor market segmentation stems from the fact that organizational labor (management) is a key element in the primary, but not in the secondary economy. Moreover, the model provides a rationale of the recent policy debate on selective immigration policies for high-skilled workers (green card).

Key words: Dual Labor Market; Organizational Labor; International Competition; Green Card.

JEL classification: D20; J31.

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1 Introduction

Two features are typical for recent economic development in industrialized countries: Increasing wage pressure in the secondary labor market on the one hand, and rising skill-requirements in the primary economy on the other hand. This has provoked two strands of policy debate: To increase employment in low-paid work, in particular in the service sector, and to offer immigration licenses (“green cards”) for high-skilled workers.

The present paper evaluates this policy debate by identifying the causes for downsizing of low-skilled employment in the primary economy and thus for the increasing wage pressure in the secondary labor market. The idea is that employment in the primary economy requires an organizational infrastructure of a firm in which workers can interact. The provision of this organizational infrastructure requires high-skilled non-production workers (e.g. in managerial occupations). We find that increases in organizational labor requirements, e.g. due to decentralized information-processing, customer-orientation and international production (Lindbeck and Snower, 1996, 2000; OECD, 1999), raise the need for high skills.¹ In addition, any power of shareholders or managers to extract rents from their firms exerts pressure to improve the skill structure of workplaces organized in a firm. By contrast, no ex ante creation of workplaces is needed in the secondary labor market. Those workers for whom no primary jobs are organized offer their labor to the secondary labor market. As a result, low-skilled workers set free due to

¹It should be noted that we do not aim to contribute to an understanding of specific aspects of organizational changes in firms. Rather, we examine a very stylized model, which accounts for the necessity to create workplaces ex ante in a macroeconomic context.
workplace decentralization, increased international competition, shareholder orientation and manager rents in the primary economy constitute additional labor supply in the secondary labor market. This implies that either wages fall and employment expands in the secondary labor market or, if there are minimum wages, part of the low-skilled labor force is unemployed.

Indeed, in the U.S. real wages at the bottom declined sharply in the last decades (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Murphy and Topel, 1997). Due to dramatic increases in unemployment rates for low-skilled labor also in Europe economists and policy makers more and more stress the need to create low-paid jobs in the service sector, for instance, by lowering minimum wages. At the same time we observe an increasing emphasis of the need for selective immigration. There is an ongoing debate about policies to attract immigration of high-skilled labor in Germany. Other developed countries, like Canada, Australia and the U.S. already select immigrants on the basis of their qualification.

This paper argues that wage pressure in the secondary labor market and demand for selective immigration are closely connected. In the present model, an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers helps to expand the primary economy and to loose wage pressure in the secondary labor market. Immigration of high-skilled labor is thus welcome both for achieving a more attractive sectorial structure and for dampening the need of lowering wages for low-skilled labor.

Other dual labor market models which attempt to explain the decline of (relative) earning opportunities for low-skilled labor rely on the notion of so-called skill-biased technological change, i.e. a biased shift in the rela-
tive productivity towards high-skilled workers. Agénor and Aizenman (1997) study the impact of biased technology shocks on the structure of wages, when sectorial differences in monitoring technologies (and thus in efficiency wages) lead to a segmentation into primary and secondary jobs. (See also Saint-Paul (1996a) for an extensive study of labor market segmentation in the presence of efficiency wage payments.) By contrast, in our model the primary and secondary labor market differ in the need to organize workplaces. For instance, firm-size wage differentials (controlling for all individually observable characteristics of workers) have been attributed to the complexity of the firm organization (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999; Bayard and Troske, 1999). Moreover, using Swiss data Ramirez (2000) finds that the share of skilled, white-collar workers within a firm (which, in line with our model, is used as proxy for a firm’s organizational complexity) positively affects wages. Thus, it is plausible to hypothesize that the primary and secondary labor market differ in the organization of firms, with more complex firms paying higher wages. This is exactly what of our model predicts.\footnote{In our model, as in the story suggested by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) to explain employer-size wage differentials, high-paying firms have market power. However, in contrast to their story, in our model equilibrium profits are zero and there is no rent-sharing of employers with workers. In our model, market power is implied by the costs to install workplaces ex ante which are fixed costs ex post (i.e. at the production stage).}

Finally, Saint-Paul (1996b) analyzes a search model with only high-skilled labor in the primary labor market and only low-skilled labor in the secondary labor market. Skill-biased technological change reduces employment of low-skilled labor, as firms have a higher incentive to wait for more productive, high-skilled workers. This incentive is stronger when more high-skilled work-
ers are available. Thus, he finds that an increase in the supply of high-skilled labor has adverse effects on employment opportunities of low-skilled workers, which is the opposite of our result. In our model, also low-skilled workers can be employed in the primary labor market, and high-skilled and low-skilled labor are technological complements in production.\footnote{Our model extends the single-sector framework of Falkinger (2000) and Falkinger and Grossmann (2001) to a dual economy.} Moreover, we analyze a general equilibrium model which emphasizes the structure of goods demand. In contrast, the analysis of Saint-Paul (1996a,b) is partial equilibrium.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the economy. Section 3 derives the equilibrium in the primary economy, whereas section 4 closes the model by analyzing the equilibrium in the secondary labor market. Section 5 discusses our comparative-static results in the light of stylized labor market facts. The last section concludes.

2 The structure of the dual economy

One (and maybe the most important) distinction between employment in the primary and secondary labor market in the literature is job rationing in the sense of involuntary non-employment in the primary labor market.\footnote{Other characteristics of primary jobs in the literature on dual labor markets include low labor turnover and high costs of adjustment of a firms’ labor force. Ultimately, differences between primary and secondary jobs must stem from technological (including organizational) differences.} For instance, it has been suggested that differences in the monitoring technology lead to a wage gap between the primary and the secondary economy, due
to efficiency wage payments in the former, but not in the latter (Saint-Paul, 1996a). One goal of this paper is to introduce an equilibrium concept which suggests a different source of job rationing in the primary economy, related to the necessity to create workplaces ex ante.

There are two sectors in the economy, a so called $x$-sector with (an exogenous number of) $n$ firms which produces a differentiated good and a $y$-sector with a representative firm which produces a homogenous good. In both sectors, labor is the only input and firms take wages as given in their employment decisions. Technologically, the sectors differ in two characteristics. First, whereas in the $x$-sector the production process and thus employment requires an organization in firms (e.g. Weitzman, 1982), in the $y$-sector, no organization of work is required. Second, whereas the $x$-sector employs both high-skilled and low-skilled labor, low-skilled labor is the only input in the $y$-sector. These characteristics are supposed to represent crucial technological features of the “primary” economy ($x$-sector) and the “secondary” economy ($y$-sector). Examples of firms in the $x$-sector include firms like General Motors and IBM. Such firms are characterized by complex organizational structures, high degree of interaction among employees and a substantial share of high-skilled workers. An extreme example of the secondary labor market would be self-employment of low-skilled workers. Realistically, one may also think of (low-paid) services like cleaning or newspaper selling as activities in the $y$-sector, which barely involve interaction among employees.

$^5$It should be noted that our equilibrium concept allows zero profits of monopolistically competitive firms in the $x$-sector, despite an exogenous number of firms $n$. In contrast to the free-entry equilibrium of e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), employment levels rather than the number of firms adjust such that profits are driven to zero.
The requirement of an organization in the $x$-sector implies that firms have to decide ex ante (i.e. before production starts) the design of workplaces. This encompasses two dimensions: the number of workplaces and the wage structure. In our model, this is reflected by two assumptions.

First, firms have to choose the amount of non-production (i.e. managerial) labor which is necessary to create the desired capacity of workplaces. The non-production labor requirements in a firm positively depend on the amounts of organized high-skilled and low-skilled production labor, respectively. It is assumed that only high-skilled labor can be employed for the creation of workplaces.$^6$ A natural set-up of a model which reflects the idea that designing workplaces is necessarily an ex ante decision is a two-stage framework. In our model, at stage 1, firms in the $x$-sector set up workplaces under perfect foresight about the ex post situation. At stage 2 (i.e. ex post) firms produce and supply their output on the goods market. Since the costs for non-production workers to set up workplaces are sunk when firms enter stage 2, imperfect competition in the goods market is implied. In our model, we assume monopolistic competition among firms in the $x$-sector (in stage 2). In contrast, there is perfect competition in the $y$-sector.

Second, firms have to choose the wage offers for the provided workplaces. Whereas in the secondary economy labor is hired in a spot market, it is assumed that firms in the primary economy not only create workplaces, but also announce wage rates before production starts. Realistically, firms in

$^6$See also Das (2001) for a model in which high-skilled workers have a double role as production and non-production workers. In his model, the non-production activity is specified as supervising in the presence of shirking of production workers.
the primary economy announce vacancies, including wage offers, ex ante. It is assumed that wage contracts in the primary labor market are fixed at the wage level anticipated by firms under perfect foresight of aggregate employment levels in the primary economy. This assumption is crucial since it precludes that, at the production stage 2, firms in the $x$-sector employ workers who underbid prevailing wage rates, i.e. no arbitrage possibilities exist ex post.\footnote{If one accepts that wage contracts in firms with a substantial degree of organizational infrastructure are fixed before production starts, one can rely on well-travelled ground by precluding wage underbidding. For instance, recent survey studies provide strong evidence that firms are reluctant to change the internal wage structure or to cut wages, respectively (Agell and Lundborg, 1995; Bewley, 2000).}

Labor markets for high-skilled and low-skilled labor are segmented, where labor supply is inelastically given by $N_H$ and $N_L$, respectively.

### 2.1 Technology

Output $x_i$ of firm $i$ in the $x$-sector is produced according to the constant-returns-to-scale production technology

$$x_i = F(h_i, l_i) \equiv l_i f(\chi_i), \quad \chi_i \equiv h_i / l_i,$$

where $h_i$ and $l_i$ denote the amounts of high-skilled and low-skilled production labor in firm $i$, respectively. $f(\cdot)$ is a strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave function which fulfills the Inada conditions and $f(0) = 0$. Before production starts, workplaces $\bar{h}_i$ and $\bar{l}_i$ for high-skilled and low-skilled labor, respectively, have to be created. Employment in production is limited
by the provided workplaces, that is: \( h_i \leq \bar{h}_i \) and \( l_i \leq \bar{l}_i \). The organizational (non-production) high-skilled labor requirement \( m_i \) to create production workplaces for \( \bar{h}_i \) and \( \bar{l}_i \) workers in firm \( i \) is given by

\[
m_i = G(\bar{h}_i, \bar{l}_i) \equiv \bar{l}_i g(\bar{x}_i), \quad \bar{x}_i \equiv \bar{h}_i / \bar{l}_i, \tag{2}
\]

where \( G \) is linear homogenous and \( g(\cdot) \) is monotonic increasing.

Production in the \( y \)-sector is unsophisticated. Low-skilled labor is the only input. Output \( y \) of the representative unit in the \( y \)-sector is given by

\[
y = L_y, \tag{3}
\]

where \( L_y \) is the employment level in the \( y \)-sector.

### 2.2 Preferences

There is a representative consumer, deriving utility from the consumption of the differentiated good produced by the \( x \)-sector and the homogenous good produced by the \( y \)-sector. Preferences are represented by a utility function \( u \) which is weakly separable in these two types of goods:

\[
u(x_1, \ldots, x_n, y) = U(X, y) = X^\alpha y^{1-\alpha}, \tag{4}
\]

\( 0 < \alpha < 1 \), where \( X \) is the quantity index of the differentiated good given by the CES-index \( X = (\sum_i x_i^\rho)^{1/\rho}, 0 < \rho < 1 \). Thus, the elasticity of demand for each variety \( i \) produced by firm \( i \) in the \( x \)-sector is constant and given by \( \sigma \equiv \frac{1}{1-\rho} \). Denoting the price of variety \( i \) in the \( x \)-sector by \( p_i \) and the price for the homogenous good in the \( y \)-sector by \( q \), we have for the optimal consumption structure

\[
mrs_i = \frac{p_i}{q}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n, \tag{5}
\]
where \( mrs_i = \frac{\partial u/\partial x_i}{\partial u/\partial y} \) is the marginal rate of substitution between \( x_i \) and \( y \).

2.3 Prices and wages

After each firm in the \( x \)-sector has chosen the number of production workplaces \( h_i \) and \( l_i \) (at stage 1; see section 3), in stage 2, firms enter monopolistic competition. Thus, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), prices are set as (constant) mark-up over marginal costs \( c \), i.e.

\[
p_i = \mu c = p,
\]

where \( \mu \equiv \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} > 1 \) denotes the mark-up factor.\(^8\) Denote nominal wage rates for high-skilled and low-skilled production workers in the primary labor market by \( w_H \) and \( w_{L,x} \), respectively. Cost minimization implies that relative wages \( \frac{w_H}{w_{L,x}} \) of high-skilled labor (in production) and the skill-intensity in production \( \chi_i \) are related by the equation

\[
\omega_x \equiv \frac{w_H}{w_{L,x}} = \frac{f'(\chi_i)}{f(\chi_i) - \chi_i f''(\chi_i)} \left( = \frac{F_1}{F_2} \right).
\]

Note that this implies \( \chi_i = \chi \). Marginal costs are given by

\[
c = \frac{w_{L,x}}{f(\chi) - \chi f''(\chi)}.
\]

\(^8\) The two-stage decision process of firms in the primary economy implies that organizational (labor) costs are not passed on to output prices. As argued above, the organizational capacity has to be determined by firms before production starts and thus organizational (labor) costs are fixed costs at the production stage. See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2000) for a one-sector monopolistic competition model in which entry costs are proportional to output like the organizational costs in our model. They also are not reflected in output prices.
according to (1) and (7). Moreover, note that at stage 2, it is optimal to utilize capacity fully; i.e. to choose employment according to \( h_i = \bar{h}_i \) and \( l_i = \bar{l}_i \). Similarly, symmetry implies \( h_i = h \), \( l_i = l \) and thus \( x_i = x = \lambda f(\chi) \) in equilibrium.

In the \( y \)-sector we have perfect competition. This implies

\[ q = w_{L,y}, \tag{9} \]

where \( w_{L,y} \) denotes the nominal wage rate (for low-skilled labor) in this sector.

In sum, according to (5), (6), (8) and (9), we obtain

\[ \frac{\partial u}{\partial x} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w_{L,x}}{w_{L,y}} \frac{\mu}{f(\chi) - \chi f'(\chi)} \left( = \frac{p}{q} \right), \tag{10} \]

where \( Q \equiv nx \) denotes total output in the primary economy and \( MRS \equiv \frac{\partial u}{\partial X} \) is the marginal rate of substitution between the differentiated good of the \( x \)-sector and the homogenous good of the \( y \)-sector. Note that, for all \( i \), \( mrs_i = MRS(Q, y) = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{w}{Q} \) in a symmetric equilibrium in the primary economy.\(^{10}\)

### 3 Equilibrium number of primary jobs

In our two-stage framework, the perfect foresight equilibrium is derived by backwards induction. In the preceding section the (profit maximizing) behavior of firms in the \( x \)-sector at stage 2 (i.e. for a given work place capacity)\(^9\)

\(^9\)Note that in a perfect foresight equilibrium the installed skill-intensity in production \( \bar{\chi} \) coincides with the skill-intensity \( \chi \) implied by the costs minimization condition (7). Moreover, firms will not install capacity for producing output which cannot be sold.

\(^{10}\)According to (4), for \( x_i = x \), \( \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_i} = \alpha \left( \frac{x}{y} \right)^{\alpha - 1} n(\alpha/\rho) - 1 \) and \( \frac{\partial u}{\partial y} = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{x}{y} \right)^{\alpha} n^{\alpha/\rho} \).
has been analyzed. At stage 1, firms in the \( x \)-sector choose their profit maximizing number of workplaces \( \bar{h}_i \) and \( \bar{l}_i \), perfectly foreseeing the equilibrium at stage 2 (taking aggregate levels as given). Profits in firm \( i \) are earnings at stage 2 minus the non-production costs incurred at stage 1. The latter are given by \( w_M m_i \), where \( w_M \) denotes the nominal wage rate of (high-skilled) non-production workers. Of course, with flexible wages, \( w_M = w_H \) must hold in equilibrium. However, allowing for rents of non-production workers, we write

\[
w_M = (1 + \theta)w_H, \quad \theta \geq 0.
\]

(11)

Note that \( \theta > 0 \) can have many reasons, treated as exogenously in our model. For instance, principal-agent theory tells us that incentive problems may lead to a deviation of wages for managers from perfectly competitive rates. Moreover, there may be sources of insider power since managers and other (non-production) workers who oversee the organizational structure have firm-specific knowledge. Although both kinds of arguments are standard in the microeconomic theory of the firm, the macroeconomic effects of such power on behalf of organizational labor have not been studied yet.

We also allow for rents of firm owners in the \( x \)-sector (e.g. due to shareholder power). It is assumed that firm owners can appropriate a share \( R \) of the revenue \( p \) per unit of sold output \( x \). In sum, a firm’s profits after accounting for possible rents are given by

\[
\pi_i = (p(1 - R) - c)x_i - (1 + \theta)w_H m_i.
\]

Using (1), (2), (6), \( \chi_i = \chi \) and the fact that all workplaces installed at stage 1 will indeed be occupied at stage 2 (i.e. \( h_i = \bar{h}_i \), \( l_i = \bar{l}_i \), \( \chi = \bar{\chi} \)), we can write this in the form

\[
\pi_i = [(\mu - 1)c f(\bar{\chi}) - (1 + \theta)w_H g(\bar{\chi})] \bar{l}_i,
\]

(12)
where
\[ \bar{\mu} = \mu (1 - R) > 1, \quad 0 \leq R < 1 - \frac{1}{\mu}. \tag{13} \]
If in (12) the term in square brackets (and thus profit) is zero, then \( \frac{\partial w_0}{\partial \mu} = 0 \) and firms do not want to provide further workplaces for low-skilled workers. This is equivalent to

\[ (\mu(1 - R) - 1)f(\bar{\mu}) = (1 + \theta)f'(\bar{\mu})g(\bar{\mu}), \tag{14} \]

where we used
\[ \frac{w_H}{c} = f'(\bar{\mu}), \tag{15} \]
according to (7) and (8).

As shown in full detail in the appendix, there are multiple (perfect foresight) equilibria in the model. First, if firms expect relatively high wages of low-skilled production workers they wish to provide a high proportion of workplaces for skilled workers so that the expansion of employment may be constrained by skilled labor supply before the zero-profit condition is reached. Second, if firms have pessimistic expectations, zero-profit equilibria with unemployment of both low-skilled and high-skilled workers result. In order to point out that job rationing (i.e. involuntary non-employment of low-skilled labor in the primary labor market) is not the result of unfavorable expectations, we focus on the zero-profit equilibrium with full employment of high-skilled labor.\footnote{This may be compared to Weitzman (1982), who also analyzes a monopolistic competition model where multiple (rational expectations) equilibria exist. As in the primary labor market in our model, in his model employment requires an organization in firms. (Unlike our model, his model neither allows for another sector where no organization of}
primary labor market reaches the highest possible level. As shown below, there is generally a wage gap between the primary and secondary labor market (i.e. \( w_{L,x} > w_{L,y} \)) in equilibrium. Thus, workers in the secondary labor market would like to work in the primary economy. However, firms provide no workplaces for them. Hence, they must supply their labor force to the less attractive secondary economy.

In a zero-profit equilibrium, the skill-intensity in production in the \( x \)-sector \( \bar{\chi} = \chi^*(z) \) is given by (14), where \( z \) is a vector of the parameters \( \mu, R \) and \( \theta \). Moreover, \( \chi^* \) depends on the technologies \( f \) and \( g \). \( \chi^*(z) \) can be determined in a familiar return-cost diagram. The left-hand side of (14) equals the “real” average profit margin per low-skilled worker (in terms of unit costs) whereas the right hand side equals “real” average non-production labor costs per low-skilled worker. (In the following we use the short-cuts \( APL \) and \( ACL \), respectively). \( APL \) is an increasing function of \( \bar{\chi} \) (starting at zero for \( \bar{\chi} = 0 \)), since output per low-skilled worker is raised by a higher skill-intensity in production. As far as the right-hand side of (14) is concerned, a marginal increase in \( \bar{\chi} \) has two effects on \( ACL \). First, the “real” wage rate for high-skilled workers \( \frac{w_H}{c} = f'(\bar{\chi}) \) declines from infinity at \( \bar{\chi} = 0 \), lowering average costs to organize workplaces for low-skilled labor. Second, work is necessary nor for heterogeneity among workers.) However, in his model involuntary unemployment is due to pessimistic expectations. In contrast, in our model due to its two-stage nature involuntary non-employment (in the primary labor market) may occur even with the most optimistic expectations.

Of course, it is also assumed that firms in the \( x \)-sector are not constrained by the supply of low-skilled labor. Otherwise the notion of a dual economy would not make sense.

In a zero-profit equilibrium \( w_{L,x} = w_{L,y} \) may only occur as a knife-edge case.
the average non-production labor requirement \( g(\bar{\chi}) \) per low-skilled job may increase. It is assumed that the latter effect does not outweigh the former. Thus, \( ACL \) is a non-increasing function of \( \bar{\chi} \). Hence, the intersection between the \( APL \)- and \( ACL \)-curve determines \( \chi^*(z) \) as depicted in figure 1.

**Figure 1**

Denoting the aggregate employment level of high-skilled and low-skilled labor in production as \( \bar{H}(= nh) \) and \( \bar{L}_x(= nl) \), respectively, we have \( \bar{H} = \chi^*(z)\bar{L}_x \). Full employment of high-skilled labor implies \( \bar{H} + M = \chi^*(z)\bar{L}_x + M = N_H \), where \( M(= nm) \) is the aggregate amount of organizational labor. Using \( M = \bar{L}_x g(\bar{\chi}) \) from (2), this implies that the employment level of primary jobs for low-skilled workers is given by

\[
L^*_x(N_H, z) = \frac{N_H}{\chi^*(z) + g(\chi^*(z))}.
\]

\( L^*_x \), as given by (16), is the maximal zero-profit equilibrium employment level of low-skilled labor in the primary labor market (corresponding to optimistic expectations and thus full employment of high-skilled labor).\(^{14} \) Note that \( L^*_x \) does not depend on the number of firms \( n \) in the \( x \)-sector.

**Proposition 1** In the zero-profit equilibrium with full employment of high-skilled labor, an increase in the supply of high-skilled labor \( N_H \): (i) Raises the equilibrium employment level of low-skilled labor in the primary labor market \( L^*_x \). (ii) Neither affects the equilibrium skill-intensity in production \( \chi^*(z) \) nor the relative equilibrium wage \( \omega^*_x \) in the \( x \)-sector.

\(^{14} \) In a zero-profit equilibrium with pessimistic expectations we would have \( H^e \) instead of \( N_H \) in (16), where \( H^e < N_H \) is the aggregate level of employment of high-skilled labor which is expected by pessimistic firms.
Proof. Directly follows from (16), (14) and (7).

If \( N_H \) rises and firms in the \( x \)-sector expect full employment of high-skilled labor, firms find it profitable to install more workplaces for low-skilled workers. This is because (all other things equal) a higher skill-intensity \( \chi \) would mean that the real profit margin per low-skilled worker increases and the real average costs for organizational labor may decrease. Thus, \( \frac{\partial \pi^*_x}{\partial N_H} > 0 \) would hold, according to (12) and (14), such that \( L^*_x \) rises until zero-profits are restored. Interestingly, wage inequality between skill groups in the primary labor market (\( \omega^{x*} \)) is not affected by an increase in high-skilled labor supply \( N_H \). This is due to the following opposing effects. First, as in conventional models with a segmented labor market for different skill groups, an increased availability of high-skilled labor reduces wage inequality, given that the skill-intensity in production increases. Second, however, if \( N_H \) increases, firms have an incentive to install more workplaces which raises the demand for (high-skilled) organizational labor. (This reduces the skill-intensity in production and raises relative wages). In our model, both effects exactly cancel.\(^{15}\) This is consistent with the stylized fact that wage inequality in the last, say, two decades did not decline despite a substantial increase in the relative supply of skilled labor (e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). Note that this result is not due to the common notion of skill-biased technological change, i.e. to an increase in the relative marginal productivity of skilled labor (for a given skill-intensity).

\(^{15}\) Formally, this is due to the linear homogeneity of both \( F(\cdot) \) and \( G(\cdot) \), which implies that the (zero-profit) equilibrium skill-intensity \( \chi^* \) does not depend on \( N_H \). See Egger and Grossmann (2000) for a similar result.
In fact, skill-biased technological change has played a major role in the economic literature of the 1990s. However, while focusing on mere changes in the production technology has been strongly criticized (e.g. DiNardo and Pischke, 1997), changes in the way how firms organize work seem more relevant in practice. Decentralized communication, international production and customer-orientation makes it more difficult to organize jobs for low-skilled workers. Formally, this means that the $g$-curve and thus the $ACL$-curve shifts upwards. This increases average costs of providing workplaces for low-skilled workers relative to their profit yield. For a more formal analysis, include a parameter $\gamma$ in the vector of exogenous changes $z$ representing increasing costs of organizing low-skilled labor, i.e. consider instead of $g(\chi)$ a family of functions $\tilde{g}(\chi, \gamma)$ with $\frac{\partial \tilde{g}}{\partial \gamma} > 0$. The following proposition summarizes the impact of parameter changes in $z = (\mu, R, \theta, \gamma)$ on $L_x^*$ and $\omega_x^*$.

**Proposition 2** In any zero-profit equilibrium, both the equilibrium employment $L_x^*$ and $\omega_x^*$ can be derived as follows. Note that, according to (7), an increase in the relative marginal productivity $F_1/F_2$ (for any given skill-intensity in production $\chi$) is equivalent to an increase in $\frac{f'/(\chi)}{f(\chi)}$. Include a parameter $\zeta$ in the vector of exogenous changes $z$ representing skill-biased technological change, i.e. define a function $v(\chi, \zeta) \equiv \frac{f'(\chi)}{f(\chi)}$ with $\frac{\partial v}{\partial \zeta} > 0$. For the impact of $\zeta$, rewrite (14) as $\frac{\mu(1-R)^{-1}}{1+\theta} = v(\chi^*, \zeta)g(\chi^*)$ to confirm $\frac{\partial \chi^*}{\partial \zeta} > 0$ (note that the term $v(\chi^*, \zeta)g(\chi^*)$ is decreasing in $\chi^*$). Thus, $L_x^*$ decreases with $\zeta$, according to (16). Moreover, it is straightforward but tedious to show that $\frac{\partial \omega_x^*}{\partial \zeta} > 0$ if and only if $f'/f > g'/g$ holds at $\chi = \chi^*(z)$.

17See Falkinger (2000) for an extensive discussion and an endogenous shift in the $g$-function.

18Note that proposition 2 holds in any zero-profit equilibrium, not just in one with full employment of high-skilled labor. We focus on optimistic expectations in order to discuss changes in the maximal (possible) equilibrium employment level in the primary labor market.
ment level of low-skilled labor in the primary labor market $L^*_x$ and the relative equilibrium wage $\omega^*_x$ increase with $\mu$ and decline with $R$, $\theta$ and $\gamma$.

**Proof.** Apply the implicit function theorem to (14) to obtain the impacts on $\chi^*$. Then use (16) and (7).

An increase in $\gamma$ means that, for any skill-intensity in production $\chi$, the ACL-curve shifts upwards, as depicted in figure 1. As non-production requirements for low-skilled labor rise, firms in the primary economy have a disincentive to create jobs for the low-skilled. An increase in $\theta$ has a similar effect, since an increased wage for non-production workers makes it less attractive to organize work places. This also means that the ACL-curve in figure 1 shifts upwards. Employment of low-skilled labor in the primary economy is reduced and high-skilled production workers lose relative to low-skilled workers since the skill-intensity in production increases. A change in $\tilde{\mu} = \mu(1 - R)$ positively affects the profit-margin per low-skilled worker, shifting up the APL-curve. Thus, the equilibrium number of primary jobs rises and, due to the declining skill-intensity in production, wage inequality increases as well. Notice that one has to distinguish carefully between market power of firms in the goods market arising from the fact that the non-production wage costs are sunk from the perspective of stage 2 and the power of firm owners to extract rents from their firms. Whereas an increased mark-up $\mu$ on marginal costs allows to finance more non-production work and thus has a positive impact on the equilibrium number of primary jobs, the opposite is true for increased shareholder claims $R$. 

18
4 Equilibrium in the secondary labor market

In this section, we derive the number of secondary jobs and the equilibrium wage differentiation for low-skilled labor between sectors.

Having determined the equilibrium number of primary jobs for the low-skilled $L^*_x$, “labor supply” in the secondary labor market $L^S_y$ equals the amount of low-skilled labor which is not employed in the primary labor market, i.e.

$$L^S_y = N_L - L^*_x(N_H, z).$$  

(17)

Labor demand in the $y$-sector $L^D_y$ is given by goods demand in this sector, implied by (10). Using (3) and substituting both $\chi = \chi^*(z)$ and $Q = Q^* = L^*_x(N_H, z)f(\chi^*(z))$ into (10) we obtain the following relationship between labor demand $L^D_y$ in the $y$-sector and the wage differential of low-skilled labor across sectors:

$$\frac{w_{L,y}}{w_{L,x}} = B(L^D_y, N_H, z),$$  

where

$$B(L^D_y, N_H, z) = \frac{\mu}{MRS \left[ L^*_x(N_H, z)f(\chi^*(z)), L^D_y \right]} \left[ f(\chi^*(z)) - \chi^*(z)f'(\chi^*(z)) \right]$$

(18)

Note that, according to (8), the term $[f(\chi^*(z)) - \chi^*(z)f'(\chi^*(z))]$ equals the “real” equilibrium wage rate $(\frac{w_{L,y}}{w_{L,x}})^*_{\text{of low-skilled labor in the primary economy}}$. It unambiguously increases with $\chi^*$.

With flexible wages, both the equilibrium number of secondary jobs $L^*_y$ and the equilibrium wage for low-skilled workers in the secondary economy relative to those in the primary economy $(\frac{w_{L,y}}{w_{L,x}})^*$ are given by the intersection of the curves defined by (17) and (18), as depicted in figure 2.

Figure 2
$B$ is negatively sloped in $L^D_y$ since $MRS$ increases in $y = L_y$. By contrast, the supply curve $L^S_y$ is vertical. For all $w_{L,y} > 1$ everybody would prefer to work in the secondary labor market.¹⁹ For $w_{L,y} \leq 1$ the amount of low-skilled labor which is left over from the primary economy does not depend on the secondary labor market. Since the number of workplaces provided in the primary economy is limited and wage underbidding is excluded, $w_{L,x} > w_{L,y}$ can (and generally does) hold in equilibrium. Moreover, the $B$-curve shifts upwards if $N_H$ increases, since in equilibrium $MRS$ is decreasing in $Q^* = L_x^* f(\chi^*)$ and thus in $L_x^*$. (Remember that $\chi^*$ does not depend on $N_H$.)

How is the $B$-curve affected by parameter changes in $z = (\mu, R, \theta, \gamma)$? Consider a change in $z$ which leads to downsizing of low-skilled labor $L_x^*$ in the primary economy. Such downsizing goes hand in hand with a rise in the skill-intensity $\chi^*$ (see (16)) and thus with a rise in the real wage $(\frac{w_{L,x}}{c})^*$ of low-skilled workers who keep their primary jobs. This has a direct negative effect on $B(L^D_y, N_H, z) = \frac{\mu}{MRS(Q^*, y)(w_{L,x}/c)^*}$. But $\chi^*$ also affects the aggregate output $Q^* = L_x^* f(\chi^*)$ of the primary economy. If $Q^*$ declines with the downsizing of $L_x^*$ and the rise in $\chi^*$,²⁰ then $MRS$, representing the relative marginal willingness to pay for the differentiated good, rises and reinforces the negative effect of $(\frac{w_{L,x}}{c})^*$ on the $B$-curve. The $B$-curve is definitely shifted downwards in this case. By contrast, if $Q^*$ rises with $\chi^*$ (i.e. if downsizing of $L_x^*$ leads to rising equilibrium output in the primary economy), then $MRS$ declines. Only if this decline in the relative willingness to pay for the differentiated good is so strong that it outweighs the positive

¹⁹Of course, this can never be an equilibrium situation. Again, we refer to the appendix for a detailed discussion of possible equilibria.

²⁰It can be shown that this is always the case if $\frac{1 + g'(\chi^*)}{1 + g(\chi)} \geq \frac{f'(\chi^*)}{f(\chi)}$ holds.
impact of the rise in $\chi^*$ on $(\frac{w_L}{c})^*$, the $B$-curve shifts upwards. However, this would be an implausible case: First, $Q^*$ would have to increase strongly despite downsizing of low-skilled labor $L^*_x$ in the primary economy. Second, output $y$ of the secondary economy (say, cleaning services) would have to be a good substitute for the differentiated good (say, cars). The following assumption excludes such an implausible demand reaction.\footnote{The following argument analoguously applies for changes in $z$ which increase $L^*_x$ and decrease $\chi^*$.}

Assumption (A): If change in $z$ induces a decline (rise) in $L^*_x$, the $B$-curve does not shift up (down).

For instance, if $f(\cdot)$ is isoelastic, then assumption (A) always holds with the Cobb-Douglas utility function (4).\footnote{Substituting $MRS(L^*_x f(\chi^*), L^*_y) = \frac{\alpha L^*_D}{(1-\alpha)L^*_f(\chi^*)}$ into (18) and using (16), we find $B(\cdot) = \frac{(1-\alpha)\mu N_H}{\alpha\chi^* + \frac{g(\chi^*)}{(1-\eta(\chi^*)) L^*_y}}$, where $\eta(\chi) \equiv \frac{\chi^* f' \chi^*}{f(\chi)}$. For $\eta(\chi) = \eta < 1$ (i.e. $f(\chi) = a\chi^\eta$), then the $B$-curve unambiguously decreases if $\chi^*$ rises. More generally, assumption (A) holds if $\eta'(\chi^*)$ is not too high ($\eta'(\chi^*) \leq 0$ would be sufficient). }

Trivially, assumption (A) is also fulfilled if preferences are quasi-linear (such that $MRS$ does not depend on $Q$).

The intersection point in figure 2 defines $L^*_y$ as a function of labor supply of both skill groups $N_H$ and $N_L$, respectively, and the other parameters $z$.\footnote{Substituting (16) into (17) reveals that relative employment of low-skilled labor in the secondary labor market $L^*_x N_H$ is a function of relative skill supply $\frac{N_H}{N_L}$ and $z$. The same is true for $L^*_y$.}

Thus, we can write

$$\left(\frac{w_L}{w_{L,x}}\right)^* = B(L^*_y(N_H, N_L, z), N_H, z) \equiv b(N_H, N_L, z). \quad (19)$$

where $\left(\frac{w_L}{w_{L,x}}\right)^* \leq 1$ must hold in such an equilibrium.
There may be limits to wage differentiation across sectors due to union power, fairness considerations among low-skilled workers across sectors, minimum wages, and the like. As figure 2 reveals, if for some reason the sectorial wage gap \( \frac{w_{L,y}}{w_{L,x}} \) cannot fall below a bound \( \hat{b} > b(N_H, N_L, z) \) (with \( \hat{b} \leq 1 \)), there is unemployment of low-skilled labor. Note that such a lower bound is equivalent to a real minimum wage for low-skilled labor. Clearly, if \( \hat{b} > b(N_H, N_L, z) \), the equilibrium unemployment rate

\[
\hat{u}_L = 1 - \frac{\hat{L}_y}{N_L}
\]

is a function of \( \hat{b} \), \( N_H \), \( N_L \), and \( z \), where \( \hat{L}_y \) denotes equilibrium employment level in the \( y \)-sector in this case.

**Proposition 3** In the zero-profit equilibrium with full employment of high-skilled labor: (i) If wages are flexible, the equilibrium employment level in the secondary labor market \( L_y \) decreases in \( N_H \) and increases in \( N_L \). The opposite results hold for \( \left( \frac{w_{L,y}}{w_{L,x}} \right)^x \). (ii) If there is a lower bound \( \hat{b} > b(N_H, N_L, z) \) on \( \frac{w_{L,y}}{w_{L,x}} \), the equilibrium unemployment rate \( \hat{u}_L \) decreases in \( N_H \) and increases in \( N_L \).

**Proof.** Use (16)-(20) and proposition 1.

Thus, wage pressure in the secondary labor market can unambiguously be softened by an increase in the supply of skilled labor by education or selective immigration policy.

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24Formally, this can be seen as follows. Denote the aggregate price index by \( \Gamma \), which should be an increasing and linear homogenous function in output prices. We can write

\[
\Gamma = \tilde{\Gamma}(p, q) \equiv q\beta(p/q) \text{ with } \beta' > 0.
\]

Thus, using \( p = \frac{\mu_{L,x}}{\mu_{L,y} + \mu_{L,x}} \) and \( q = w_{L,y} \), the real wage in the secondary labor market is given by

\[
\frac{w_{L,y}}{w_{L,x}} = \left[ \beta \left( \frac{\mu_{L,x}}{\mu_{L,y} + \mu_{L,x}} \right) \right]^{-1}.
\]

Thus, imposing \( \frac{w_{L,y}}{w_{L,x}} > \hat{b} \) puts a lower bound on the real wage in the \( y \)-sector.
Proposition 4 Under assumption (A), in any zero-profit equilibrium: (i) If wages are flexible, $L_y^*$ decreases in $\mu$ and increases in $R$, $\theta$ and $\gamma$. The opposite results hold for $\left(\frac{w_L}{w_L^*}\right)^*$. (ii) If there is a lower bound $\hat{b} > b(N_H, N_L, z)$ on $\frac{w_L}{w_L^*}$, the equilibrium unemployment rate $\hat{u}_L$ decreases in $\mu$, and increases in $R$, $\theta$ and $\gamma$.

Proof. Use (16)-(20) and proposition 2. ■

According to proposition 4, there are essentially three candidates for explaining the rising wage pressure for already low-paid work: Changes in the competitive pressure of firms (reflected by a decrease in $\mu$), increasing rents of firm owners and organizational labor (reflected by an increase in $R$ and $\theta$, respectively), and changes in methods of organizing work (reflected by an increase in $\gamma$). Note that all these forces are changes in the primary economy. In the following, we will summarize the mechanisms and intuitions behind propositions 3 and 4 and discuss their implications.

5 Discussion

5.1 Increased competitive pressure (Globalization)

The competitive pressure in the goods markets of the primary economy in our model is represented by the mark-up factor $\mu$ which is inversely related to the price elasticity of demand faced by firms. A decline in this mark-up, for instance, due to international competition, forces firms to cut overhead costs. This can be done by reducing workplaces for low-skilled workers whose return is relatively low compared to the organizational costs they cause. Formally,
improving the skill-structure in production, i.e. raising the skill-intensity of created workplaces, increases the profit margin \((APL)\) and decreases non-production costs \((ACL)\), so that the decline in \(\mu\) can be compensated, according to \((14)\). This downsizing of low-skilled jobs in the primary economy increases labor supply in the secondary labor market. Under the plausible assumption that the goods produced in the secondary market are not a very good substitute for the goods in the primary economy (assumption \((A)\)), this supply effect either depresses wages in the secondary economy or leads to higher unemployment of low-skilled labor.

5.2 Changes in production and organization methods

Firm-level evidence suggests that skill-upgrading, computerization and workplace decentralization are strongly related (For an excellent survey of this evidence, see Bryanjolfsen and Hitt, 2000.) That is, rising labor demand for high-skilled workers seems to be due to changes in methods to organize work, rather than mere (biased) changes in the production technology.\(^{25}\) In our model, changes in the organization of work have a very natural place, since organization of production by non-production workers is the central building block of the model. Formally, the method of organization is captured by the parameter \(\gamma\), which affects the \(g\)-function. New methods of organization like customer orientation, international production or decentralized information-processing and decision-making requires relatively high abilities of workers. In other words, the costs of organizing jobs for low-skilled workers rises under

\(^{25}\)See also Bresnahan (1999) and Snower (1999) for illuminating discussions.
new organization methods. In our model, this is reflected by an upward shift of the $g$-function and thus of the firms’ costs $ACL$ of arranging workplaces for low-skilled workers. This induces firms in the primary economy to an upgrading of the skill-structure by downsizing their low-skilled work force. The workers who are set free from the primary economy constitute additional supply of low-skilled workers in the secondary labor market. Again, under the weak assumption $(A)$, with flexible wages the secondary economy expands and wages go down; with rigid wages unemployment is raised.

5.3 Changes in rents for the key factors of the primary economy

Production in the primary economy is complex and requires interaction within the infrastructure provided by firms. This interaction within firms requires an organization. Thus, both the owners of the firms and organizational workers (managers) are in a powerful position. Their power may allow them to extract rents. Actually, the fact that shareholder orientation has become such an important issue during the last decade may be interpreted in two ways: Either, others (some stake holders) had appropriated rents before and shareholder-oriented management has to cut these rents and bring them back to the owners of the firms; or shareholders have become so powerful that

\footnote{For simplicity, we neglected the productivity gains which presumably result by such organizational changes. Formally, increases in total factor productivity would reduce unit costs $c$ and would increase output per low-skilled worker $f(\cdot)$. As a result, profits and thus the skill-intensity $\chi^*$ in the zero-profit equilibrium are not affected by productivity increases, according to (12).}
they can appropriate a rent that they could not appropriate before. In our model, this means an increase in $R$. At the same time we have recently seen a sharp, many would say an extreme rise in manager salaries also compared to the rise of the wages of high-skilled workers in general. In our model, this is reflected by an increase in $\theta$. Now, a rise in $R$ decreases the profit margin ($APL$) that can be retained per low-skilled worker. And a rise in $\theta$ increases the costs ($ACL$) of organization. Both effects can only be counteracted by firms of the primary economy if they improve their skill structure (i.e. increase $\chi$) by cutting workplaces of low-skilled workers. Under the assumption of a plausible demand reaction (assumption ($A$)) the consequences for the secondary labor market are a depression of wages or an increase in unemployment.

5.4 Immigration of high-skilled labor (Green card)

Having discussed the factors which can explain the increased pressure on the secondary labor market, our model provides a rationale of the debate (currently in Germany) about green cards for high-skilled workers. Indeed, our analysis predicts that an increase in the supply of high-skilled labor (by education or selective immigration) induces firms in the primary economy to create more jobs for low-skilled workers and reduces the pressure on the secondary labor market. This is because a larger available skilled labor force allows to maintain the skill structure of workplaces in the primary economy despite a higher level of low-skilled employment. Of course, more jobs for low-skilled labor in the primary economy means ceteris paribus less supply of low-skilled labor in the secondary labor market and thus less pressure on
wages. There is also a positive demand effect. The fact that the primary sector expands improves the relative price of the goods of the secondary economy. With competitive markets, this shifts the labor demand curve in the secondary labor market upwards and reduces the wage pressure in the secondary economy in addition to the reduction in labor supply.

6 Conclusion

We started out by observing the following trends that have marked the politico-economic discussion in many industrialized countries in recent years: Substantial changes in the primary economy both in the competitive environment and inside firms, in particular in the organization of work. We also observed a widespread shareholder orientation and a rise in wages of high-skilled labor, in particular sharply rising salaries for organizational labor (managers). Moreover, increased pressure on the secondary labor market revealed by unemployment or declining wages of low-skilled workers. Finally, practice or discussion of selective immigration policies for high-skilled workers.

We have presented a model which succeeds to explain these different trends in a coherent and natural way. The central element of the explanation is that, due to its complexity, production in the primary economy requires the ex ante creation of workplaces. The necessary organizational labor input depends on both the number and the skill structure of organized workplaces. Profit-maximizing job provision behavior of firms leads to job rationing in the primary economy. Those low-skilled workers who do not get a workplace
in the primary economy form labor supply in the secondary labor market.

The common feature of increased competitive pressure in the goods markets of the primary economy, for instance through globalization, of new methods of production, or of rising rents for both firm owners and organizational labor is that they induce firms to improve the skill structure of the provided workplaces by cutting down jobs for low-skilled labor. This downsizing effect raises the pressure on the secondary labor market.

An increase in the supply of high-skilled labor allows firms in the primary labor market to create more jobs for low-skilled labor without reducing the skill-intensity of their job structure. Thus, the primary economy expands and the pressure on the secondary labor market is reduced, all other things equal. Therefore, increasing the supply of high-skilled labor, be it by education or immigration is indeed good also for the secondary labor market in the considered economy. Of course, if the increase of high-skilled labor comes from immigration, there is another economy which loses high-skilled workers. And there we have exactly the opposite effect: The primary economy shrinks and pressure on the secondary economy rises. Only the increase of high-skilled labor supply by education avoids such negative external effects on other countries.

**Appendix**

In this appendix, we show which kind of (perfect foresight) equilibria can exist in our model.

Expected variables of firms in the $x$-sector (from the perspective of stage
1) are denoted by superscript “$e$”. $\bar{\chi}^e = \frac{H^e}{L^e}$ and $M^e = \bar{L}^e g(\bar{\chi}^e)$ imply $H^e = \bar{H}^e + M^e = [\bar{\chi}^e + g(\bar{\chi}^e)] \bar{L}^e$, where $H^e$ denotes aggregate expected employment of high-skilled labor. If $H^e = N_H$ ($H^e < N_H$) we speak of optimistic (pessimistic) expectations. If $\bar{\chi}^e = \chi^*(z)$ (from (14)), we have

$$H^e = [\chi^*(z) + g(\chi^*(z))] \bar{L}^e, \quad (A.1)$$

which relates (expected) aggregate employment levels of high-skilled and low-skilled labor in the $x$-sector when profits are zero. This “zero-profit line” is depicted in figure 3.

**Figure 3**

It is easy to see that the area above the zero-profit line in figure 3 corresponds to positive profits, whereas the area below this line means negative profits.

Given expectations $\bar{\chi}^e$ for the aggregate skill-intensity in production in the primary economy, each firm expects a wage differential $\omega_x^e = \Lambda(\bar{\chi}^e)$, where $\Lambda(\bar{\chi}^e) \equiv \frac{f(\bar{\chi}^e)}{f(\bar{\chi}^e) - \bar{\chi}^e} f(\bar{\chi}^e)$ (use (7)). Thus, from the perspective of stage 1, the optimal (i.e. cost-minimizing) skill-intensity is given by $\bar{\chi}_i = \Lambda^{-1}(\omega_x^e) = \bar{\chi}^e$. Hence, according to (12), real profits (in terms of unit costs) of firm $i$ in the $x$-sector from the perspective of stage 1 can be written as

$$\hat{\pi}_i = \frac{\pi_i}{c} = \left[\left(\tilde{\mu} - 1\right) f(\bar{\chi}^e) - \left(1 + \theta\right) \left(\frac{w_H}{c}\right)^e g(\bar{\chi}^e)\right] \bar{l}_i. \quad (A.2)$$

Note that $(\frac{w_H}{c})^e = f'(\bar{\chi}^e)$, according to (15). If the term in square brackets in (A.2) is positive (negative) firms want to raise (reduce) $\bar{l}_i$ and at the same time $\bar{h}_i$ according to $\bar{h}_i/\bar{l}_i = \bar{\chi}^e$. If $\hat{\pi}_i = 0$ (i.e. $\bar{\chi}^e = \chi^*(z)$),
firms have no incentive to deviate. Thus, any point on the line between points 0 and A in figure 3 can be an equilibrium. Point A is the zero profit equilibrium with full employment of high-skilled labor (i.e. optimistic expectations) on which we have focused in this paper. Note that points like C, D and E in figure 3 cannot be equilibrium situations. At point C, the term in square brackets of (A.2) is positive such that firms would like to raise the number of workplaces for both high-skilled and low-skilled labor. At points D and E, firms want to reduce capacity. Finally, note that any situation with full employment of high-skilled labor and non-negative profits, i.e. not just point A but any point on the line between B and A in figure 3 can be a perfect foresight equilibrium. Although at such a point (except at A) it would be profitable to raise employment levels $\bar{h}_i$ and $\bar{l}_i$ along $\bar{\lambda}$, firms have no incentive to do so if high-skilled labor is already fully employed. They obviously cannot expect to be able to fill additional workplaces for high-skilled workers. And deviating from $\bar{\lambda}$ by extending $\bar{l}_i$ alone would imply losses since $\bar{\lambda}$ is the cost-minimal choice.

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Figure 1: Skill-intensity of production in the primary economy in zero-profit equilibrium.
Figure 2: Equilibrium in the secondary labor market.
Figure 3: Zero-profit equilibrium \((L^*_x, N_H)\) in the primary economy.