The problem of dream skepticism is one of the most familiar in philosophy: the problem of how we can ever know that we are awake and not asleep and dreaming. I offer a partial solution to the problem: a solution which depends on certain background commitments and which is not applicable to all mental states (though it is applicable to many). I will suggest that, if my argument is successful, it may also open up a path for dealing with external world skepticism more generally.
Wann? | 24.10.2018 17:15 - 19:00 |
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Wo? | MIS 04 4122 Avenue de l'Europe 20 1700 Fribourg |
Vortragende | Daniel Gregory
(University of Tübingen) |
Kontakt | Departement de Philosophie Julien Bugnon julien.bugnon@unifr.ch Avenud de l'Europe 20 1700 Fribourg 026 300 7524 20 |
Anhang |